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RESPONSE 
FRAUD ON THE MARKET:  AN ACTION WITHOUT A CAUSE  
AMANDA M. ROSE† 
In response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political 
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market,1 Professors William 
Bratton and Michael Wachter argue that it is time to cut down the in-
famous “judicial oak”2 that is the fraud-on-the-market class action 
(FOTM, to use their lexicon)—time to stop the pointless pruning, and 
grind the stump itself.  They suggest that the SEC act as arborist, eli-
minating through rulemaking the Basic Inc. v. Levinson3 presumption 
of reliance that makes FOTM possible, as part of a grand bargain with 
Congress over the agency’s budget.  Coupling the elimination of 
FOTM with a step up in the agency’s enforcement resources, they ar-
gue, would mitigate any reduction in fraud deterrence that might 
otherwise result.4  Should this approach prove infeasible, the authors 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.  
1 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69. 
2 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (referring to 
the private Rule 10b-5 cause of action as a “judicial oak which has grown from little 
more than a legislative acorn”). 
3 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
4 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 149. 
ROSE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2011  8:08 PM 
88 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 160:87 
would give corporations the choice to opt out of FOTM pursuant to a 
federally mandated shareholder vote.5 
Bratton and Wachter build a compelling case against FOTM and 
in favor of stepped-up public enforcement efforts, efforts targeted at 
individual wrongdoers rather than the corporate enterprise, the 
FOTM target of choice.  They draw on a rich body of scholarship chal-
lenging FOTM’s efficacy vis-à-vis the goals of investor compensation 
and fraud deterrence.  The authors also discuss, and ultimately dis-
card, emerging “corporate governance” justifications for FOTM.  After 
exposing its fatal weaknesses, Bratton and Wachter attempt to explain 
FOTM’s stubborn persistence, pointing to both politics and the SEC’s 
perceived resource constraints.6  These perceived resource constraints 
led the Supreme Court to famously declare in its 1964 decision J.I. 
Case Co. v. Borak that private enforcement is a “necessary supplement” 
to the SEC’s efforts to enforce the securities laws.7  Whatever the truth 
of that statement when written, the authors demonstrate that much 
has changed in the intervening forty-seven years. 
In this Response, I do not disagree with any of the core points 
made in The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market.  (My scholarship 
has similarly emphasized the benefits of shifting away from FOTM to 
greater reliance on public enforcement mechanisms.)8  Instead, I take 
the opportunity to elaborate on the deterrence and governance 
shortcomings of FOTM, strengthening further the case Bratton and 
Wachter make for an enhanced public enforcement role.  In conclu-
sion, I suggest avenues for overcoming the political hurdles to 
reform that the authors identify, so that we might someday actually 
“get there from here.”9 
******** 
 
5 Id. at 166. 
6 Id. at 103. 
7 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
8 See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence:  
A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) [hereinafter Rose, The Multien-
forcer Approach] (evaluating the efficiency of the United States’ approach to securities 
fraud deterrence, which utilizes federal regulators, state regulators, and class action 
lawyers); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:  Restructuring the Rela-
tionship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 
1307 (2008) [hereinafter Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform] (arguing for fur-
ther exploration of SEC oversight of securities fraud class actions). 
9 See Bratton and Wachter, supra note 1, at 107 (suggesting that, with regard to a 
proposed movement from enterprise liability to individual liability, “no one seems able 
to chart a plausible course that takes us from here to there”). 
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Bratton and Wachter’s deterrence critique of FOTM proceeds in 
four steps:  (1) personal, not enterprise, liability is the best way to de-
ter securities fraud, yet FOTM almost never results in individual con-
tributions to settlement payments; (2) refocusing FOTM actions on 
individual defendants would require a downward adjustment of sanc-
tions, because otherwise it would produce unacceptable overdeter-
rence costs; (3) such a reduction in sanctions would drastically reduce 
private incentives to bring suit; (4) ergo, we must tolerate the second-
best deterrent effects of the current FOTM regime or rely more heavi-
ly on public enforcement (the latter being the better option, in the 
authors’ view).  In this part, I provide a theoretical basis for the au-
thors’ preference for individual liability, and suggest that private en-
forcement would remain inferior to public enforcement even if suffi-
cient private incentives to bring suit remained after a downward 
adjustment of FOTM sanctions. 
I.  THE THEORETICAL PROBLEMS WITH ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN FOTM 
The standard economic justification for enterprise liability begins 
with the premise that personal liability will not deter socially harmful 
conduct by firm agents if those agents are judgment-proof or are oth-
erwise resistant to liability incentives.10  But there are steps, the argu-
ment proceeds, that a firm (through its higher-level agents) can take 
to help minimize the amount of social harm its agents cause in the 
course of their employment—for example, careful employee selection 
criteria, monitoring and supervision, or if all else fails, an adjustment 
of the firm’s activity level.  In the absence of enterprise liability, how-
ever, a firm’s owners would lack incentive to cause their firm to invest 
in measures to prevent agents from imposing costs on third parties—
and they might in fact encourage such behavior if it would increase firm 
profitability.  Enterprise liability is therefore warranted, the argument 
concludes, because it forces a firm’s owners to internalize fully the 
costs their agents impose on third parties, incentivizing them to invest 
socially optimal amounts of firm resources in internal deterrence 
measures.11  What if firm agents are not resistant to liability incentives, 
 
10 See Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 5-6), available at http://ssrn.com/-
abstract=1769946. 
11 For classic expositions of this argument, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.8, at 188-90 (7th ed. 2007); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230 (2004); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic 
Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. 
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or are in fact overly sensitive to them?  In those cases, the choice be-
tween enterprise and exclusive personal liability does not matter 
much—the firm and its agents can bargain to an efficient allocation 
of liability inter se.12 
This argument for enterprise liability is compelling in many situa-
tions.  It is unconvincing, however, when used to defend corporate 
liability for secondary market fraud, if we assume (as Bratton and 
Wachter do) that most shareholders are well diversified.  Scholars 
have long asserted that well-diversified shareholders stand to pocket 
gains as often as they sustain out-of-pocket losses from secondary mar-
ket fraud, just as those shareholders are as likely to recover damages 
in FOTM cases as to pay them through their ownership of the defen-
dant firm.  These assertions are commonly used to defeat the compen-
satory justification for FOTM.  Less appreciated is that they also un-
dermine its deterrence justification:  the specter of damages in FOTM 
actions will not change the incentives of diversified shareholders if 
those shareholders face an equal likelihood of receiving as of paying 
them.  Corporate liability under these circumstances is simply ineffec-
tive as a cost-internalization technique.13  Nor is it necessary, given that 
diversified shareholders naturally internalize many of the social costs 
of fraud and thus have an incentive to deter it even in the absence of 
corporate liability.14  As Professor Jack Coffee has colorfully observed, 
corporate liability for secondary market fraud “is a strategy akin to 
punishing the victims of burglary for their failure to take greater pre-
cautions.”15 
In a forthcoming essay titled Intraportfolio Litigation,16 Professor Ri-
chard Squire and I explain that an assumption of broad shareholder 
diversification undermines the standard deterrence justification for 
 
REV. 1345, 1345-46 (1982); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1231, 1246 (1984).   
12 For example, if there were no enterprise liability but the firm could more effi-
ciently bear a certain type of liability risk, then it could offer firm agents indemnity.  
But see infra note 21.  
13 As Bratton and Wachter explain, there are some “clear losers in the federal se-
curities litigation game”—investors who can expect to pay more in damages through 
their ownership of defendant firms than they can expect to receive as members of 
FOTM classes.  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 97.  These include “mom-and-pop” 
long-term investors, hardly a group well positioned to influence corporate behavior. 
14 For a discussion of the social costs of fraud, see Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, 
supra note 8, at 2179-80. 
15 John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:  An Essay on Deterrence and 
Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1562 (2006). 
16 Rose & Squire, supra note 10 (manuscript at 11-13). 
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corporate liability not only in the FOTM context, but also in any in-
tercorporate dispute.  I refer you to that piece for fuller exposition, 
but the core idea can be simply stated:  shareholders naturally want 
firms in their portfolio to avoid imposing deadweight costs on other 
firms in their portfolio, because such behavior would diminish their 
overall wealth.  Put differently, forcing one firm you own to pay dam-
ages to another firm you own in proportionate amount will do noth-
ing to improve your incentives to invest in precautions ex ante—yet 
the pocket-shifting exercise will cause you to incur transaction costs ex 
post in the form of attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs.  The 
more shareholder portfolios expand to approximate the entire mar-
ket, the less traction the standard deterrence justification for corpo-
rate liability has vis-à-vis intercorporate disputes. 
We do not conclude from this that intercorporate litigation would 
serve no purpose in a market dominated by broadly diversified share-
holders.  Instead, we identify a new justification for it, one focused on 
protecting diversified shareholder interests.  We call it the “informa-
tional theory” of corporate liability.17  We posit that although diversi-
fied shareholders care about maximizing portfolio value more than 
the value of any individual portfolio firm, individual firm managers 
have the opposite priority.  Their compensation and future career 
prospects are tied to firm rather than portfolio performance—the 
higher their firm’s profits, the more valuable their incentive-based 
pay, and the less likely they are to lose their jobs.  Thus, corporate 
managers might be tempted to boost profits by externalizing (and al-
lowing their subordinate agents to externalize) costs onto other port-
folio firms.  Corporate liability can mitigate this conflict of interest by 
ensuring that the firm’s reported profits will reflect its management 
team’s true contribution to overall portfolio value, including damage 
the firm’s agents have caused to other portfolio firms.  Corporate lia-
bility, thus conceived, does not give diversified shareholders the incen-
tive to take steps to deter wealth-destroying activity by corporate 
agents—they already have that incentive if we are focused on firm-on-
firm misconduct.  Instead, it is a mechanism through which diversified 
shareholders can act on that incentive.  Although the costs of this me-
chanism are not trivial, shareholders might be willing to pay them if 
corporate liability promised a greater reduction in residual portfolio-
level agency costs. 
 
17 Id. (manuscript at 10). 
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The informational theory of corporate liability advanced in Intra-
portfolio Litigation obviously relates to the nascent “corporate gover-
nance” justifications for FOTM that Bratton and Wachter discuss and 
ultimately discard.  Like those justifications, the informational theory 
focuses on what a lawsuit promises to reveal to investors about the 
quality of the defendant firm’s management team, and it supports a 
shareholder right to opt out of corporate liability.  But the informa-
tional theory—also like those justifications—lends little support to 
FOTM at the end of the day.18  FOTM is unlikely to be a cost-justified 
portfolio governance tool for a variety of reasons we discuss in our es-
say.  Importantly, FOTM produces a relatively trivial amount of new 
information about a firm’s management team.  Fraud is seldom first 
revealed through the initiation of FOTM litigation; in most instances, it 
is ferreted out by the media or another source, and this alone is suffi-
cient to cause the firm’s stock price to take a hit—a hit that tends to far 
exceed the firm’s expected legal penalty.19  In light of this, it is difficult 
to believe that the anticipated settlement payments in FOTM suits—
which are mostly funded by insurance anyway and thus have no imme-
diate effect on the firm’s financials—have anything more than a very 
marginal ex ante effect on managerial incentives.20  And if corporate 
liability makes it easier for captured boards to insulate culpable officers 
from personal liability, as it likely does,21 its ex ante effects on mana-
gerial incentives will be negative. 
 
18 The informational theory presents a stronger defense for intercorporate liability 
in other legal areas.  See id.  (manuscript at 20) (noting that the informational theory 
may justify “[m]any lawsuits based on traditional common law causes of action”). 
19 See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? 2 (Am. Fin. 
Ass’n 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, Chicago Booth Sch. Bus. Research Paper No. 08-
22, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482 (finding that private litigation 
accounted for only 3% of the alleged incidents of fraud between 1996 and 2004 in 
companies with more than $750 million in assets); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost 
to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (find-
ing that a firm’s reputational losses resulting from financial fraud “exceed[] the legal 
penalty by over 7.5 times, and . . . the amount by which firm value was artificially in-
flated by more than 2.5 times”). 
20 When insurers pay judgments (or settlements), it undermines the informational 
value of corporate liability.  This problem would be mitigated if insurers charged high-
er premiums to firms that have greater liability risk, as higher premiums would eat into 
those firms’ reported profits.  However, Professors Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith 
have found that “there is not a large marginal difference between the . . . premium[] 
paid by a well-governed firm relative to a poorly-governed firm . . . .”  Tom Baker & 
Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:  The Directors’ & Officers’ 
Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1821 (2007).   
21 I noted earlier that the choice between enterprise liability and exclusive person-
al liability does not matter much when firm agents are not resistant to liability incen-
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I therefore agree with Bratton and Wachter that it would be better 
to focus securities fraud liability on the culpable individuals, rather 
than on the corporation that employs them.  I also agree that doing so 
would require a dramatic reduction in the currently nonsensical 
measure of damages in FOTM suits,22 which if applied to individuals 
would discourage any sane person from becoming a corporate execu-
tive.  The following section explains why this is the case, and the rea-
son highlights the advantage of public over private enforcement even if 
private incentives to bring suit could be preserved in the wake of a 
significant reduction in sanctions. 
II.  THE ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
Securities fraud has no redeeming social value.  Thus, absent a 
risk of legal error, it is not an offense that requires a carefully cali-
brated sanction:  society would be best served by creating very punitive 
sanctions so as to eliminate any incentive to commit fraud.23  Unfortu-
 
tives, because the firm and its agents can bargain to an efficient allocation of liability 
inter se.  A caveat is in order.  Those who decide whether to shelter firm agents from 
personal liability are themselves higher-level firm agents, and may not always act in 
ways that maximize corporate wealth.  Thus, a corporate board may choose to insulate 
officers from personal liability, even when doing so increases the likelihood of fraud 
and firm-level liability, without compensating reductions in overdeterrence costs.  This 
possibility exists regardless of whether there is enterprise liability or exclusive personal 
liability:  in a world with enterprise liability, the board might cause the defendant-firm 
to settle the suit without requiring any contributions from individual wrongdoers (this 
is typical in FOTM); in a world with exclusive personal liability, the board might cause 
the firm to indemnify the individual wrongdoers for their settlement payments.  But 
state corporate law requires boards to make an affirmative determination that officers 
are entitled to indemnity.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (mandating a de-
termination that the defendant acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably be-
lieved to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation).  No such affir-
mative judgment is necessary for the board to forgo seeking contribution.  Thus, it is 
less likely that boards would succumb to inappropriate pressures to indemnify than to 
inappropriate pressures to cause the firm to shoulder the entire settlement payment.  
22 See Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, supra note 8, at 1322-23 (critiquing 
the damages measure used in 10b-5 cases). 
23 Deterrence theory teaches that the law should assign a monetary sanction to 
behavior equal to its social costs multiplied by the inverse of the probability that the 
sanction will be imposed.  SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 483.  But a society may choose 
not to recognize the utility derived from certain categories of illicit activities; the goal 
of sanctions targeted at such activities would be to deter them unconditionally, rather 
than to encourage potential defendants to weigh social costs against personal benefits.  
A sanction of this sort may be set at an arbitrarily high level.  See generally Robert Coo-
ter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).  Notably, only individual 
wrongdoers should be threatened with a sanction designed to unconditionally deter—
not the firm that employs them.  This is because enterprise sanctions “in excess of the 
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nately, there is a nontrivial risk of false positives in securities fraud 
cases.  Determining liability requires judges (and worse, juries) to eva-
luate the accuracy of statements (and worse, omissions) in hindsight, 
and to infer from that and other circumstantial evidence the defen-
dant’s intent to deceive.  This can be incredibly difficult.  It is the risk 
of false positives, and not the risk of high sanctions alone, that leads to 
the overdeterrence concerns that Bratton and Wachter raise24—it is 
cheap and easy for corporate officers not to lie, but to avoid being mis-
judged a liar, they may spend excessive corporate resources scrubbing 
disclosures before they are made, or just keep quiet.  Either course 
hurts shareholders, and society more broadly, perhaps even more so 
than securities fraud itself.25 
Profit-driven private enforcement exacerbates the risk of false po-
sitives.  If the chance a judge or jury will decide a case in the plaintiff’s 
favor is substantial enough to render the litigation a positive net-
present-value investment, a private enforcer may pursue the case even 
if there is real doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.  And potential defen-
dants know this, and will adjust their behavior accordingly to avoid the 
risk of being misjudged a fraudster.  Lowering sanctions will reduce 
the number of positive net-present-value litigation opportunities, and 
hence the level of overdeterrence, assuming private enforcers’ com-
pensation is tied to the sanction recovered (as it is today).  But even 
cases with a very high probability of success might not be worth the lit-
igation expenses if sanctions are set too low.  Bratton and Wachter see 
this as a Catch-22:  private enforcement cannot work in a FOTM re-
gime that targets individuals, because, to avoid unacceptable overde-
terrence costs, the sanctions would have to be set at a level too low to 
incite any significant interest in private enforcement.  The increased 
underdeterrence costs that would result might overwhelm the savings in 
overdeterrence costs.  Hence, they conclude that increased public en-
forcement is necessary if we are to shift away from enterprise liability. 
One could imagine, however, ways to decouple the plaintiff attor-
neys’ fees from the sanction the defendant pays—for example, 
 
social cost of the crime (adjusted for the probability of nondetection) will cause the 
private gains from monitoring to exceed the social gains,” leading to “an inefficiently 
high level of investment in monitoring.”  Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate 
Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324 (1996).  This discussion therefore assumes a legal 
regime that does not utilize enterprise liability. 
24 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 107-09. 
25 See Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 8, at 2184 (explaining how 
“overdeterrence produces some of the very same social costs as securities fraud” by in-
creasing the cost of capital and upsetting the allocative efficiency of the economy). 
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through public funding of private securities fraud litigation.  Thinking 
through how such funding would need to be structured reveals why 
public enforcement would be a superior option even if sufficient pri-
vate incentives to bring suit could be maintained after a downward ad-
justment of FOTM sanctions.  A taxpayer-funded award of plaintiff at-
torneys’ fees would clearly have to be contingent on the lawyer’s 
successful resolution of the case, via settlement or judgment at trial.  
Moreover, the amount of the promised award would need to be set 
high enough to incite “good” litigation (that is, litigation with a suffi-
ciently high probability of success), but low enough to render margin-
al cases unattractive.  This is necessary because even if securities fraud 
sanctions are capped at the levels Bratton and Wachter suggest,26 
overdeterrence will remain a risk so long as officers face a nontrivial 
possibility of legal error.  Thus, discouraging borderline cases would 
remain important, so as to keep overdeterrence costs in check.  The 
higher (or lower) the anticipated fee award is, the lower (or higher) 
the probability of success necessary to render the litigation attractive 
to a private enforcer.  Set the award too high, and overdeterrence 
costs may swamp the savings in underdeterrence costs; set the award 
too low, and risk the opposite. 
How easy would it be to arrive at such a Goldilocks figure in the 
real world?  The fact is that using money to incent securities enforce-
ment is fraught with difficulties.27  These difficulties could be avoided 
if the enforcer were motivated not by money but by a desire to maxim-
ize social welfare.28  Instead of looking to a rigid and imprecise finan-
cial proxy to determine if a case is worth pursuing, such an enforcer 
would directly consider the expected benefits of the suit in terms of 
future savings in underdeterrence costs and weigh those benefits 
against the expected enforcement costs—including the overdeter-
rence costs the suit might generate. 
Of course, it would be naïve to presume that the SEC’s enforce-
ment choices are always the product of such a calculation, or that such 
calculations are always accurate when made.  The SEC is staffed by 
 
26 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 107 (suggesting “a fine capped at $5, $10, 
$20, or $30 million, or, alternatively, a fine set at a percentage of individual net worth” 
depending on the size of the company and its level of executive pay). 
27 Policymakers could try to reduce the risk of false positives in more direct ways as 
well, such as by narrowing the scope of the fraud prohibition or increasing procedural 
hurdles to bringing successful suits.  As I have detailed elsewhere, however, these blunt 
maneuvers come at a cost, for they weed out meritorious suits as well as nonmeritorious 
ones.  See Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 8, at 2184-88, 2192-93. 
28 See id. at 2194-97.  
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human beings who may sometimes fail to act in the public interest 
and who will naturally make mistakes.  But the proper question is not 
whether the incentives and abilities of SEC staffers are perfect, but 
whether those staffers are likely to do a better job at getting the deli-
cate deterrence calculus right than would profit-driven private enforc-
ers.  I believe that they are—or at least that they could be.29  There are 
a variety of tools available for better aligning the incentives of bureau-
crats, including those at the SEC, with the public interest.  Moreover, 
many of the offsetting benefits that we normally associate with private 
enforcement—such as detection advantages and meaningful victim 
compensation—are not produced in the FOTM context.30 
Thus, I agree with Bratton and Wachter that FOTM should be 
scrapped in favor of public enforcement not because a reduction in 
sanctions would render a private enforcement regime infeasible, but 
because I believe public enforcement could do a better job even if pri-
vate enforcement remained a viable alternative.  And I would encour-
age policymakers to couple the shift away from FOTM and toward 
public enforcement not only with an increase in the SEC’s budget, as 
Bratton and Wachter suggest, but also with reforms designed to better 
align the incentives of SEC personnel with the public interest.31 
CONCLUSION 
In The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, Professors Bratton 
and Wachter build a compelling case for scrapping the securities 
fraud class action that has long been derided in the academic litera-
ture and shifting to increased reliance on public enforcement me-
chanisms.  I am convinced.  But Bratton and Wachter also describe 
the formidable political barriers that exist to implementing this policy 
shift, without offering any real suggestions for how to overcome them.  
That is understandable.  Their article is already extremely ambitious 
in its breadth.  In this conclusion, I offer my preliminary thoughts on 
 
29 See Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, supra note 8, at 1343 (observing 
that correcting the misalignment between profit-driven private enforcers’ incentives 
and the public interest “may be more difficult than—or at least as difficult as—
monitoring the [SEC] for capture or regulatory inefficiency”). 
30 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 578-80 (discussing detection advantages as a 
factor weighing in favor of private enforcement).  The SEC’s new Whistleblower Boun-
ty Program may prove to be a more effective way to generate private information about 
securities fraud than FOTM.  See Office of the Whistleblower, SEC.GOV, http://www. 
sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).   
31 For a discussion of possible reforms to better the SEC, see Rose, The Multienforc-
er Approach, supra note 8, at 2224-27. 
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how we might “get there from here,” the logical next question scho-
lars in this field must confront. 
Bratton and Wachter tell a sad story about the persistence of 
FOTM.  That story involves politicians who place special interests 
above the social welfare—namely, the interests of attorneys who di-
rectly profit from FOTM and those of the “management class” who 
benefit because FOTM helps to insulate them from personal liability.  
These politicians get away with their malefaction because the public 
suffers from the illusion that FOTM is a vehicle for challenging the 
privileged status of corporate managers and for vindicating share-
holder interests, when in fact it serves to protect managers at the ex-
pense of shareholders. 
If their story is correct, the only way forward involves breaking the 
illusion.  That means educating shareholders (and perhaps misguided 
but well-meaning politicians) about the reality of FOTM, and convinc-
ing them of the superiority of the public enforcement option so that 
they might use their clout to pressure Congress for reform.  Articles 
like The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market are an important step in 
this regard, but only if they are read outside the ivory towers of aca-
demia.  Scholars writing in this field should expand the names on 
their reprint lists to include policymakers, shareholder activists, and 
institutional money managers—including those who run hedge funds, 
mutual funds, and public pension funds.  We should invite them to 
our conferences and seek to keep an open dialogue with them.  Per-
haps we also have something to learn from them about hidden bene-
fits of FOTM, or hidden dangers of public enforcement.  To be sure, 
the groups I mention face their own conflicts of interest, but they may 
be the best shot we have at actually improving upon the status quo.  
And if that isn’t a viable goal, what’s the point? 
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